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A Canonical Form for PROV Documents and its Application to
Equality, Signature, and Validation
Luc Moreau, University of Southampton
We present a canonical form for PROV that is a normalized way of representing PROV documents as mathe-
matical expressions. As opposed to the normal form specified by the PROV-CONSTRAINTS recommendation,
the canonical form we present is defined for all PROV documents, irrespective of their validity, and it can be
serialized in a unique way. The article makes the case for a canonical form for PROV and its potential uses,
namely: comparison of PROV documents in different formats, validation, and signature of PROV documents.
A signature of a PROV document allows the integrity and the author of provenance to be ascertained; since
the signature is based on the canonical form, these checks are not tied to a particular encoding, but can be
performed on any representation of PROV.
CCS Concepts: •Information systems→ Semantic web description languages; Data encoding and
canonicalization; •Security and privacy → Digital signatures; •Theory of computation → Data
provenance;
1. INTRODUCTION
Provenance is adopted in an increasing number of applications with a view to provide
novel functionality. For instance, in climate science1, it is used to link up all relevant
scientific artefacts leading to some conclusions; in the legal context2; it provides de-
tails of the minute steps involved in transforming legal notices before publication; in
the “Araport” biology portal3, it is used to provide credits to datasets and services pub-
lishers; in disaster response [Ramchurn et al. 2015], it helps provide notifications when
knowledge of the situation invalidates previous plans.
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) defines provenance as a record that de-
scribes how entities, activities, and agents have influenced a piece of data [Moreau and
Missier (eds.) 2013]. Such a record is only useful if it can be trusted. To ascertain trust
of a provenance record, the W3C further provides a mechanism to express the prove-
nance of provenance, allowing the context of the creation of a provenance record to
be described; it can include information such as the provenance author, its creation
date, and its generation process. Again, such a record is useful as long as it can it-
self be trusted to be an authentic description. Thus, some have begun to argue for
the use of signatures for provenance records [Hasan et al. 2009; Gadelha and Mattoso
2008; Seneviratne and Beckett 2016], while others have simply implemented their own
method of signing provenance2. A cryptographic signature of provenance guarantees
its integrity (meaning that it has not been tampered with) and its non-repudiation
(meaning that the signer cannot deny its existence) [van Tilborg 2005].
1http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report
2https://www.thegazette.co.uk/
3https://www.araport.org/
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Against this background, PROV is a set of W3C specifications [Groth and Moreau
(eds.) 2013] aiming to facilitate the representation and exchange of provenance on the
Web. PROV consists of a conceptual data model and serializations to various technolo-
gies. The support of multiple technologies is exploited by some provenance-enabled ap-
plications that use pipelines to process multiple PROV representations: a pipeline may,
for instance, capture provenance with PROV-XML [Hua et al. 2013] or PROV-N [Moreau
et al. 2013], store it in RDF (PROV-O [Lebo et al. 2013]), query it with SPARQL, and per-
form client-side rendering using PROV-JSON [Huynh et al. 2013] retrieved by content
negotiation.
Therefore, at any point in the pipeline, a component may have to sign or verify a
signature of the provenance it processes. Thus, there is a requirement for signatures
to be defined on a logical form of PROV. A similar requirement has been tackled in
different contexts, by developing a logical representation of some data model, before
signing a serialization into an array of bytes [Eastlake and Jones 2001]: XML Signa-
ture [Eastlake et al. 2008] defines Canonical XML, a serialization of XML invariant
to some permitted syntactic changes; RDF signature is based on a canonical form of
RDF [Carroll 2003], similarly exploited to sign JSON-LD messages [Sporny 2015; Lon-
gley and Sporny 2016]. The canonization process of PROV differs from the canonization
of an XML or RDF representation of PROV, because there are logically equivalent PROV
expressions that do not have a unique mapping to XML or RDF.
The problem of signature for PROV documents is further compounded because the
W3C did not define equivalence between the various PROV serializations. If a canonical
representation of PROV was defined, equality of two representations r1 and r2 could
be defined in terms of equality of their respective canonical representations c1 and
c2. Only then, would it become possible to obtain a signature for representation r by
signing its canonical representation c.
The problem of defining a canonical form for PROV has been addressed in part. The
PROV-CONSTRAINTS specification [Cheney et al. 2013] defines a notion of normal form,
as a necessary intermediate representation before checking whether a PROV document
is consistent, i.e. whether it has a plausible logical interpretation. Unfortunately, not
all PROV documents have a normal form. Indeed, according to PROV-CONSTRAINTS,
there is a set of invalid provenance documents that do not have a normal form. It
means that we could not sign these nor determine their equivalence. So, a notion of
normal form for PROV that is defined independently of PROV validity is a critical step
towards PROV signature and serialization equivalence.
Thus, the contributions of this paper are as follows: i) a canonical form for PROV;
ii) a notion of equality for PROV representations; iii) a signature technique based on
PROV Canonical Form; iv) a reformulation of the validation algorithm in terms of PROV
Canonical Form; v) an empirical evaluation demonstrating the cost of transforming to
canonical form and producing signatures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed
discussion on why a canonical form of PROV is needed. Section 3 introduces a few
preliminaries, before Section 4 defines PROV Canonical Form and a function to convert
any document into this canonical form. Section 5 then discusses three applications
of PROV Canonical Form, namely conversion between serializations, signatures, and
validation. Section 6 embarks on an empirical evaluation of the conversion to canonical
form. Section 7 contrasts this approach to related work. The paper then concludes with
a discussion of future extensions in Section 8.
2. THE CASE FOR A CANONICAL FORM FOR PROV
The PROV data model is a vocabulary to express the provenance of resources. It consists
of three core classes: An entity is a piece of data, a data set, a document, a decision we
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want to describe the provenance of. An activity is something that happened in the
world. An agent is responsible for activities, entities and other agents. Those concepts
can be linked with some associations. Two such associations are as follows. An entity
may be generated by an activity: for instance, a picture was the result of a drawing
activity. An entity may be derived from another entity: a plot was calculated from a
data set. We refer the reader to the definition of PROV for a complete description of the
vocabulary [Moreau and Missier (eds.) 2013].
2.1. Transformation Derived from PROV Constraints
Let us consider a PROV document D1 consisting of a single triple stating that a resource
e was generated by resource a:
:e prov:wasGeneratedBy :a. (D1)
According to PROV-CONSTRAINTS [Cheney et al. 2013], Constraint PCO50 (typing)
allows us to determine that e is of type “entity”, whereas a is of type “activity”. An
alternate document D2 could be constructed including this typing information.
:e a prov:Entity.
:a a prov:Activity. (D2)
:e prov:wasGeneratedBy :a.
Obviously, documents D1 and D2 are syntactically different, since they contain a dif-
ferent number of triples, but they are logically equivalent. Determining the domain
and range of properties can be supported by RDFS-reasoning [Brickley and Guha
2014]. However, PROV comes with further reasoning rules.
Let us consider the following document D3. The first “block of triples” is a description
that (entity) e was generated by (activity) a at some point in time. The second block
of triples is a description that the same entity was generated by the same activity at
some location.
:e prov:qualifiedGeneration [prov:activity :a;
prov:atTime "2012-03-31T09:21:00"^^xsd:dateTime]. (D3)
:e prov:qualifiedGeneration [prov:activity :a;
prov:atLocation dbpedia:Southampton].
According to PROV-CONSTRAINTS [Cheney et al. 2013], Constraint PCO24 (unique-
generation) requires the unicity of generation for a given entity-activity pair. Thus,
we infer the existence of a single generation that took place at the time and location
indicated, which can be expressed in document D4 as follows.
:e prov:qualifiedGeneration [prov:activity :a;
prov:atTime "2012-03-31T09:21:00"^^xsd:dateTime; (D4)
prov:atLocation dbpedia:Southampton].
Again, documents D3 and D4 are distinct but logically equivalent according to PROV.
These two examples illustrate that within a given representation, here RDF, we can
construct documents that are distinct according to RDF model theory [Hayes and Patel-
Schneider 2014], but are logically equivalent according to PROV. To be able to establish
semantic equivalence of documents, it is, therefore, necessary to convert them into a
canonical form, which can then be comparable with syntactic means.
2.2. Round-Trip Conversion Between Representations
Libraries, such as ProvToolbox4, are capable of converting between PROV representa-
tions, by reading a given format, building an internal representation (here in Java),
4http://lucmoreau.github.io/ProvToolbox/
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and then converting it to other representations. Ideally, round-trip conversions, say
from PROV-N to RDF and back, should “preserve” the original representation. The
core of the PROV data model is easily mapped to all serializations. For instance, e
prov:wasGeneratedBy a in RDF is simply mapped to wasGeneratedBy(e,a,-) in PROV-
N, and vice-versa. For those cases, round-trip conversions are easily proven correct.
However, there are many cases, for which the PROV family of specifications does not
provide guidance on how to ensure safe round-trip conversion. For instance, document
D5 contains two descriptions about a single generation event (named gen1), respec-
tively involving two entities e1 and e2, and two different times.
wasGeneratedBy(gen1; e1, a, 2012-03-31T09:21:00) (D5)
wasGeneratedBy(gen1; e2, a, 2012-03-31T09:22:00)
Conversion to RDF leads to D6:
:e1 prov:qualifiedGeneration :gen1.
:e2 prov:qualifiedGeneration :gen1. (D6)
:gen1 prov:activity :a.
:gen1 prov:atTime "2012-03-31T09:21:00"^^xsd:dateTime.
:gen1 prov:atTime "2012-03-31T09:22:00"^^xsd:dateTime.
Conversion back to PROV-N could result in document D7 in which it appears that the
generation times have been swapped, compared to D5.
wasGeneratedBy(gen1; e1, a, 2012-03-31T09:22:00) (D7)
wasGeneratedBy(gen1; e2, a, 2012-03-31T09:21:00)
This example is challenging because it does not have a normal form according to
PROV-CONSTRAINTS, since gen1 is a key for the two expressions, and thus, parame-
ters in corresponding positions (e1 and e2) are expected to be the same. Therefore,
in absence of PROV-CONSTRAINTS normal form, we are unable to compare D5 and D7.
PROV-CONSTRAINTS declares them invalid. Thus, we argue that the validity of a doc-
ument should not affect our ability to convert it to other representations, to provide
correct round-trip conversion for it, and to define its canonical representation.
2.3. Signing Documents
Whether a provenance document is valid or not, it is essential to be able to sign it, since
a digital signature allows us to authenticate it (determine its author) and ascertain its
integrity (determine whether it has been altered).
ProvStore [Huynh and Moreau 2014] is an example of a provenance management
system that accepts provenance in any format, stores it in a SQL database, and allows
for it to be retrieved in any PROV-supported format. A consumer of provenance may
want to validate a signature of a provenance document, irrespective of the format in
which it was being deposited and is being accessed. A canonical representation of PROV
documents is hence required to be able to sign such documents in any representation.
2.4. Requirements for PROV Canonical Form
From the discussion in the previous sections, we derive the following requirements to
be satisfied by PROV Canonical Form. We discuss them below.
REQUIREMENT 2.1 (UNIVERSAL CANONICAL FORM). PROV Canonical Form must
exist for all syntactically correct PROV constructs, whether valid or not.
REQUIREMENT 2.2 (INVARIANCE). PROV Canonical Form is invariant to statement
order and PROV inferences in PROV-CONSTRAINTS [Cheney et al. 2013].
REQUIREMENT 2.3 (CANONICAL FORM EQUALITY). Equality of terms in PROV
Canonical Form must be defined.
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REQUIREMENT 2.4 (CLOSED UNDER MERGE). A PROV Canonical Form must exist
for any term resulting from the merging of two terms in PROV Canonical Form.
REQUIREMENT 2.5 (CANONICAL FORM DISTINGUISHED SERIALIZATION). PROV
Canonical Form must have a unique distinguished serialization suitable for signing.
There is an expectation of universality, guaranteeing that all PROV documents can
be given a canonical form (Requirement 2.1). Provenance documents in a given format
typically have multiple representations because of different statement order: these
variants should have a single canonical form, but also applying common PROV infer-
ences should not alter a document’s canonical form (Requirement 2.2). We aim to de-
fine equality of representations in terms of the equality of their canonical forms, so the
latter needs to be defined (Requirement 2.3).
In systems running continuously, one may want to understand how today’s behavior
differs from the past week’s behavior. Thus, in such a context, incremental processing
of provenance is critical. A fundamental operation that must be supported is the ability
to merge provenance. While it is understood that validity is not preserved by the merge
operation [Cheney et al. 2013; Kwasnikowska et al. 2015], it is critical that one can
derive a canonical form from the merge of two canonical forms (See Requirement 2.4).
To be able to sign a document, there needs to be a unique serialization of its canonical
form (Requirement 2.5).
The normal form (NF) defined by PROV-CONSTRAINTS satisfies Requirements 2.2
and 2.3. However, the process of transforming to NF is a partial function that is not
defined when unification fails; thus, NF does not meet Requirement 2.1. Combining
two documents in NF may result in a document for which there is no NF, thus failing
Requirement 2.4. PROV-CONSTRAINTS does not define a serialization format for NF, in
particular given the introduction of existential identifiers which require similar treat-
ment to RDF blank nodes; hence, Requirement 2.5 is not met for NF. Given this, there
is a need for a novel PROV Canonical Form, which addresses all these requirements.
We present it in Section 4, after some preliminaries.
3. PRELIMINARIES
In the following section, we define a function to transform PROV documents into their
canonical form. We adopt a functional style and rely on a few common combinators
of functional programming [Odersky et al. 2010]. We summarise them below and also
provide a link to their Scala definition.
map(S, f) Builds a new set by applying a function f to all elements of set S (see Scala doc)
fmap(S, f) Builds a new set by applying a function f to all elements of set S and taking the union
of the resulting sets (see Scala doc)
groupBy(S, f) Partitions set S into a map of sets according to some discriminator function f (see
Scala doc)
reduce(S, f) Reduces the elements of set S using the associative binary operator f (see Scala doc)
M.values Collects all values of a map M in a set (see Scala doc)
mapValues(M, f) Transforms map M by applying a function f to every retrieved value (see Scala doc)
4. PROV CANONICAL FORM
4.1. Idealized PROV Language
In this section, we present an idealized definition of PROV, for which we subsequently
investigate a canonical form. This version is idealized because it aims to minimize
the number of terms that need to be handled. We make it explicit where we deviate
from the normative definition of PROV [Moreau and Missier (eds.) 2013]. We adopt
a language syntax that is closely inspired by the functional notation PROV-N [Moreau
et al. 2013]. We limit our presentation to the syntactic dimension of PROV; for semantic
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aspects, we refer the reader to normative documents [Moreau and Missier (eds.) 2013;
Cheney et al. 2013].
According to Figure 1, a PROV document is a set of bundles and terms. A bundle
is a named set of terms. Bundles were introduced in PROV to be able to express the
provenance of provenance. By definition, the contents of documents and bundles have
an unspecified order.
Terms in Idealized PROV can be nodes (term1) or relations (term2, . . . , term4).
A bundle or a node must be identified by a name (in practice, a URI). An instance
of a relation connecting several nodes can optionally be identified by a name as well.
This is marked by the notation (ηo).
All terms, whether nodes or relations, can contain further descriptions in the form of
key-value pairs. Keys are of the form (κ), whereas values can be names (η) or primitive
constants (pi), such as numbers, booleans, or strings.
Relations are primarily binary relations, linking an influencee ηe to an influencer ηr,
always appearing right after the optional identifier.
In accordance to PROV, we distinguish three categories of relations. Relations de-
noted by term2 are pure binary relations between ηe and ηr with an optional identifier
ηo. Relations denoted by term3 are ternary relations, which associate an influencer ηr
and an influencee ηe with a further node η1. Relations are further subtyped and Fig-
ure 1 displays the permitted predicates for each relation. Finally, relations denoted by
term4 make associations between five names and are also optionally identified with ηo;
the five names include an influencer ηr and an influencee ηe, but also a further node η1,
and two further identifiers η2, η3 intended to denote two relations; this construct pro-
vides the means to express the details of a derivation (see prov:Derivation [Moreau
and Missier (eds.) 2013]).
Constructs PROV Predicates
document ::= document (bundle | term)∗
bundle ::= bundle(ηi, term∗) node ∈ {entity, activity, agent}
term ::= term1 | term2 | term3 | term4 rel1 ∈ {wasGeneratedBy, used,
term1 ::= node(ηi, [κi = η, . . . , κj = pi, . . .]) wasAttributedTo,wasInvalidatedBy,
term2 ::= rel1(ηo, ηe, ηr, [κi = η, . . . , κj = pi, . . .]) wasInformedBy,wasInfluencedBy,
term3 ::= rel2(ηo, ηe, ηr, η1, [κi = η, . . . , κj = pi, . . .]) specializationOf, alternateOf,
term4 ::= rel3(ηo, ηe, ηr, η1, η2, η3, [κi = η, . . . , κj = pi, . . .]) hadMember}
document ∈ Document rel2 ∈ {wasStartedBy,wasEndedBy,
bundle ∈ Bundle wasAssociatedWith, actedOnBehalfOf}
term ∈ Term rel3 ∈ {wasDerivedFrom}
Sets Positional roles
η ∈ N Set of names
pi ∈ P Set of constants, with total order pii < pij if i < j
κ ∈ K Set of keys, with total order κi < κj if i < j
ηe influencee
ηr influencer
ηi mandatory identifier
ηo optional identifier
η1,2,3 optional argument
Fig. 1. Idealized PROV
Idealized PROV deviates from normative PROV in two ways. Some PROV binary rela-
tions of type specializationOf, alternateOf, hadMember do not allow for attributes and op-
tional identifiers [Moreau 2016]: thus, Idealized PROV is a superset of normative PROV.
We have added these features for reasons of uniformity and for addressing some use
cases [Moreau 2016]. The PROV-N notation allows for time annotations in various po-
sitions of the model. These are not explicit arguments of the Idealized PROV functional
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notation, but instead, should be encoded as part of the key-value pairs. So, overall, all
terms of normative PROV can be encoded in Idealized PROV.
4.2. Mergeable PROV
To support incremental processing of provenance, we justified Requirement 2.4 by the
need to merge provenance. Thus, we introduce the notion of mergeable PROV, displayed
in Figure 2. The structure of documents is similar to that of Idealized PROV (Figure 1),
except for names being replaced by sets of names. The rationale for this design stems
from constraints defined in PROV-CONSTRAINTS, which we now explain.
According to PCO23 (key-properties), the identifier field η0, if defined, is a key for
a relation; thus, it uniquely determines the other parameters of that relation. As we
are not trying to determine whether constraints are satisfied, we do not seek to unify
identifiers as in PROV-CONSTRAINTS; instead, inspired by this constraint, we allow for
relations with the same identifier to be merged, by taking the union of their parame-
ters in corresponding positions as well as the union of all their attribute-value pairs.
Constructs
m document ::= document (m bundle | m term)∗
m bundle ::= bundle(Θi,m term∗)
m term ::= m term1 | m term2 | m term3 | m term4
m term1 ::= node(Θi, [κi = η, . . . , κj = pi, . . .])
m term2 ::= rel1(Θo,Θe,Θr, [κi = η, . . . , κj = pi, . . .])
m term3 ::= rel2(Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1, [κi = η, . . . , κj = pi, . . .])
m term4 ::= rel3(Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1,Θ2,Θ3, [κi = η, . . . , κj = pi, . . .])
m document ∈ M Document
m bundle ∈ M Bundle
m term ∈ M Term
with node, rel1, rel2, rel3 defined in Figure 1, and with Θ ⊆ N.
Positional roles Accessors
Θe influencee
Θr influencer
Θi mandatory identifier
Θo optional identifier
Θ1,2,3 optional argument
id ↓ kind ↓ terms ↓
m bundle Θi bundle m term∗
m term1 Θi node
m term2 Θo rel1
m term3 Θo rel2
m term4 Θo rel3
Fig. 2. Mergeable PROV
Likewise, PCO24 (unique-generation) stipulates that the pair of parameters ηe, ηr
acts a key for the binary relation rel1 = wasGeneratedBy, which implies that the other
parameters should be mergeable in a pair-wise fashion; in particular, the optional iden-
tifiers should be mergeable.
From this, we can define a merge operation, such that Mergeable PROV is closed
under the merge operation, meaning that the merge of two mergeable constructs is also
a mergeable construct. (This contributes towards Requirement 2.4.) The conditions
under which the merge operation is triggered are described in Section 4.4.
Definition 4.1 (merge). The binary operator merge takes two mergeable constructs
and returns a mergeable construct. Two constructs with the same predicate can be
merged by taking the union of parameters in corresponding positions; we provide the
definition for nodes (1) and terms of category term2 (2). Bundles (3) can be merged if
they have the same set of identifiers.
merge(node(Θ1i , attr
1), node(Θ2i , attr
2)) (1)
= node(Θ1i ∪Θ2i , attr1 ∪ attr2)
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merge(rel1(Θ
1
o,Θ
1
e,Θ
1
r, attr
1), rel1(Θ
2
o,Θ
2
e,Θ
2
r, attr
2)) (2)
= rel1(Θ
1
o ∪Θ2o,Θ1e ∪Θ2e,Θ1r ∪Θ2r, attr1 ∪ attr2)
merge(bundle(Θi, terms
1), bundle(Θi, terms
2)) (3)
= bundle(Θi, terms
1 ∪ terms2)
4.3. PROV Inferences
The PROV-CONSTRAINTS specification defines inferences over provenance documents.
To ensure invariance to PROV inferences (Requirement 2.2), PROV-CONSTRAINTS in-
ferences have to be re-defined over mergeable terms. We outline them here.
Type Inference. Section 2.1 already discusses type inference PCO50 (typing).
We sketch its application to mergeable terms: whenever there is a term
wasGeneratedBy(Θo,Θe,Θr, attr), we can infer entity(Θe, [ ]) and activity(Θr, [ ]), mean-
ing that there is an entity denoted by identifiers in Θe, and an activity, denoted by
identifiers in Θr. Types are to be inferred similarly to all applicable cases.
WasInformedBy Inference. According to PCO6 (generation-use-communication-
inference), for wasGeneratedBy(Θ1o,Θ1e,Θ1a, attr1) and used(Θ2o,Θ2a,Θ1e, attr2), one can in-
fer wasInformedBy(∅,Θ2a,Θ1a, [ ]), meaning that the activity denoted by Θ2a was informed
by the activity Θ1a.
SpecializationOf, AlternateOf. Relation SpecializationOf is irreflexive and tran-
sitive. Relation AlternateOf is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive; furthermore,
AlternateOf can be inferred from revisions (a subtype of derivation) and Spe-
cializationOf. The adaptation of the following inferences to mergeable terms is
straightforward: PCO12 (revision-is-alternate-inference), PCO16 (alternate-reflexive),
PCO17 (alternate-transitive), PCO18 (alternate-symmetric), PCO19 (specialization-
transitive), PCO20 (specialization-alternate-inference).
WasInfluencedBy. According to PCO15 (influence-inference), any relation is also
an influence: Thus, for instance, wasGeneratedBy(Θ0,Θa,Θe, attr) also implies
wasInfluencedBy(Θ0,Θa,Θe, attr).
All the above inferences are being applied to mergeable terms (M Term) to meet Re-
quirement 2.2. However, Inference PCO5 (communication-generation-use-inference),
referred to as a completion rule [Kwasnikowska et al. 2015], infers the existence of a
communicated entity. But neither PROV, nor the PROV Mergeable Syntax offers an ex-
istential quantifier or blank nodes to express this inference, so it is not applicable here.
To sum up, we introduce a function inference to capture all the above inferences over
mergeable documents, with the signature: inference : M Document → M Document .
Full details about inferences are available in supplementary online material.
4.4. PROV Canonical Form
PROV Canonical Form is a mergeable PROV construct (or set of constructs) that is in-
variant to common PROV inferences (Section 4.3) and PROV-CONSTRAINTS key prop-
erties (Section 2). We provide a function that can convert a PROV document into its
canonical form. It consists of two key steps, the mapping of a PROV document to PROV
mergeable form, followed by its reduction to canonical form.
4.4.1. Injection. The mapping of a PROV document to the PROV mergeable form is
straightforward: it just requires each name occurring as a parameter of a construct
to be replaced by a set containing that name. We note that some names ηo, η1, η2, η3
are optional. If unspecified, they are mapped to the empty set; if specified, they are
mapped to singleton sets. (This behavior is expressed by toSet.)
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inject : Document→ M Document
inject(document (t∗)) = document map(t∗, inject))
inject(node(ηi, attr)) = node({ηi}, attr)
inject(rel1(ηo, ηe, ηr, attr)) = rel1(toSet(ηo), {ηe}, {ηr}, attr)
inject(rel2(ηo, ηe, ηr, η1, attr)) = rel2(toSet(ηo), {ηe}, {ηr}, toSet(η1), attr)
inject(rel3(ηo, ηe, ηr, η1, η2, η3, attr)) = rel3(toSet(ηo), {ηe}, {ηr}, toSet(η1), toSet(η2), toSet(η3), attr)
inject(bundle(ηi, terms
∗)) = bundle({ηi},map(terms∗, inject))
where toSet(−) = ∅ and toSet(η) = {η}.
4.4.2. Rearrange. According to Constraint PCO23 (key-properties), a key for a rela-
tion uniquely determines the other parameters of that relation. Thus, the two terms
wasGeneratedBy({gen0}; {e1}, {a}, ∅) and wasGeneratedBy({gen0}; {e2}, {a}, ∅), have the
same key {gen0}, and can be merged into wasGeneratedBy({gen0}; {e1, e2}, {a}, ∅), which
signifies that e1 and e2 are regarded as equivalent. To propagate the equivalence of
e1 and e2 to the whole document, we assume that we have computed the equivalence
relation between names, which partitions the set of names into subsets of equivalent
names. From this relation, we define a membership function Ψ, which is a partial func-
tion associating a name with the set of terms it is equivalent with. Thus, we define
a general rearrange function RS that replaces each name of a document with a set of
names, relying on a function S mapping names to sets of names.
S : N⇀ Set(N)
RS : M Document → M Document
RS(document (t∗)) = document (map(t∗,RS))
RS(node(Θ, attr)) = node(fmap(Θ,S), fmap(attr,RS))
RS(rel1(Θo,Θe,Θr, attr)) = rel1(fmap(Θo,S), fmap(Θe,S), fmap(Θr,S), fmap(attr,RS))
RS(rel2(Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1, attr)) = rel2(fmap(Θo,S), fmap(Θe,S), fmap(Θr,S), fmap(Θ1,S), fmap(attr,RS))
RS(rel3(Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1,Θ2,Θ3, attr)) = rel3(fmap(Θo,S), fmap(Θe,S), fmap(Θr,S), fmap(Θ1,S), fmap(Θ2,S),
fmap(Θ3,S), fmap(attr,RS))
RS(bundle(Θi, terms∗)) = bundle(fmap(Θi,S),map(terms∗,RS))
RS(κ = pi) = {κ = pi}
RS(κ = η) = map(S(η), λη′.κ = η′)
4.4.3. Finding Equivalent Names. The presence of a set of names Θ in a construct indi-
cates that the names in that set are regarded as equivalent. The function F computes
the set of all sets of equivalent names in a mergeable m term or m bundle.
F : M Term ∪M Bundle → Set(Set(N))
F(node(Θ, attr)) = {Θ}
F(rel1(Θo,Θe,Θr, attr)) = {Θo,Θe,Θr}
F(rel2(Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1, attr)) = {Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1}
F(rel3(Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1,Θ2,Θ3, attr)) = {Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1,Θ2,Θ3}
F(bundle(Θi, terms
∗)) = {Θi} ∪ fmap(terms∗,F)
To merge terms, we define a general function index membership(t∗, key, active, nn)
that indexes a set of terms t∗ : Set(M Term) according to their type Kind and some key
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key : (M Term → Object), resulting in an index indx : ((Kind×Object)→ Set(M Term))
and a membership function Ψ : (N⇀ Set(N)).
To construct an index, we use the function groupBy that partitions a set into a map
of sets according to some discriminator function λt.〈kind ↓ (t), key(t)〉, which pairs up
the kind of a term with its parametric key. The set of terms are then merged into a
single term, by application of reduce to merge. Since not all the terms necessarily have
a key to index on, a predicate active, passed as argument to index membership, is used
to decide whether to apply reduce to the appropriate terms.
index membership : Set(M Term)× (M Term → Object)
× (Kind×Object→ Boolean) × Set(N)
→ ((Kind×Object)→ Set(M Term))× (N⇀ Set(N)))
index membership(t∗, key, active, nn) = let indx = map( groupBy(t∗, λt.〈kind ↓(t), key(t)〉),
λ〈p, l〉.〈p, if active(p) then{reduce(l,merge)} else l〉)
let Ψ = make membership(fmap(indx, λ〈k, t〉.F(t)) ∪ nn)
in 〈indx,Ψ〉
index membershipi,k : Set(M Term)→ (N→ Set(N))
index membershipi(t
∗) = index membership(t∗, id ↓, λ〈kind, id〉.id 6= ∅, ∅)
index membershipk(t
∗) = index membership(t∗, key, λ〈kind, key〉.key 6= false, ∅)
The function index membership is instantiated in two different ways:
index membershipi is indexing terms by their identifiers (implementing PCO23
(key-properties)), whereas index membershipk indexes those relations that
have a compound key (implementing PCO24 (unique-generation), PCO25
(unique-invalidation), PCO26 (unique-start), and PCO27 (unique-end)). For
the latter, the auxiliary function key defines a compound key for terms
wasGeneratedBy,wasInvalidatedBy,wasStartedBy,wasEndedBy, as follows.
key(rel1(Θo,Θe,Θr, attr)) = 〈Θe,Θr〉 if rel1 ∈ {wasGeneratedBy,wasInvalidatedBy}, Θe 6= ∅, and Θr 6= ∅
key(rel2(Θo,Θe,Θr,Θ1, attr)) = 〈Θe,Θ1〉 if rel2 ∈ {wasStartedBy,wasEndedBy}, Θe 6= ∅, and Θr 6= ∅
key( ) = false otherwise
The function index membership relies on make membership to compute the transitive
closure of the equivalence relation and creates a membership function Ψ.
make membership : Set(Set(N))→ (N⇀ Set)
make membership(ss∗) = fmap(transitive closure(ss∗), λss.map(ss, λn.〈s, ss〉))
4.4.4. Term Fusion. PROV-CONSTRAINTS defines an algorithm based on unification to
determine a normal form NF in the process of validating expressions; an implementa-
tion of this approach [Moreau et al. 2014] showed that full unification was not required
to compute NF. Here, instead of relying on unification, we define a procedure fusion
that applies a membership function Ψ using the rearrange function of Section 4.4.2. In
a first instance, we create an index with term identifiers.
fusioni : Set(M Term)→ Set(M Term)
fusioni(t
∗) = let 〈indx,Ψ〉 = index membershipi(t∗)
in fmap(indx.values, λt.RΨ(t))
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In a second instance, we index terms that have a compound key (obtained by key):
fusionk : Set(M Term)→ Set(M Term)
fusionk(t
∗) = let 〈indx,Ψ〉 = index membershipk(t∗)
in fmap(indx.values, λt.RΨ(t))
Such a succession of operations is repeated until we converge to a canonical form,
for which we introduce the type PCF Term, specified in Section 4.4.5.
fusion : Set(M Term)→ Set(PCF Term)
fusion(t∗) = let t∗1 = fusionk(fusioni(t
∗))
in if t∗1 = t
∗ then t∗ else fusion(t∗1)
4.4.5. Transformation To Canonical Form. We can now specify the transformation of a
PROV document to a document in canonical form (PCF Document). First, we define the
notion of canonical form, which is invariant to PROV inferences as per Requirement 2.2.
Definition 4.2 (Canonical Form). A set of terms t∗ (a document d) is in canonical
form, noted t∗ ∈ Set(PCF Term) (d ∈ PCF Document), if it is in mergeable form t∗ ∈
Set(M Term) (d ∈ M Document) and is invariant to inference (inference) and fusion
(fusion).
The transformation to canonical form requires a document to be mapped to its
mergeable form, all inferences performed, and fusion applied.
canonical : Document→ PCF Document
canonical(d) = fusion(inference(inject(d)))
We can establish the unique existence of a canonical form for a set of terms.
THEOREM 4.3 (CANONICAL FORM EXISTENCE). For any set of terms, there exists a
unique canonical form.
PROOF. The proof can be sketched as follows. Each iterative step of fusion involves
a partition of the set of names. At the start, before any iteration has taken place,
each name is only equivalent to itself. Thus, the number of subsets in the partition is
given by the number of names. Each fusion step strictly reduces the number of terms,
the number of name subsets, or both. There is a lower bound, which minimally con-
sists of a single term and a single subset of names, by which all names are regarded
as equivalent. Thus, there can only be a finite number of iterations until a fixpoint
is reached. Furthermore, canonical is deterministic and therefore results in a unique
fixpoint. Such a fixpoint satisfies the definition of canonical form, and thus Require-
ments 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4.
Supplementary material explains how bundles are supported by the fusion function.
To illustrate PROV Canonical Form, Figure 3 shows a PROV document. The canon-
ization process merges the two instances of entities, the generations with identifier
ex:gen10 (with fusioni), and the generations with identifiers ex:gen10 and ex:gen20
(with fusionk). The PROV canonical form, also displayed in Figure 3, consists of a set of
three terms (for clarity, we have not included inferred wasInfluencedBy edges).
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4.5. Canonical Form Equality
Equality on mergeable terms, and therefore on canonical forms, forms the essence of
Requirement 2.3. For two terms to be equal, their corresponding constituents must
be equal and they must have the same kind. For instance, for terms of type m term2,
equality is defined as follows.
rel11(Θ
1
o,Θ
1
e,Θ
1
r, attr
1) = rel21(Θ
2
o,Θ
2
e,Θ
2
r, attr
2)
if Θ1o = Θ
2
o, Θ
1
e = Θ
2
e, Θ
1
r = Θ
2
r, attr
1 = attr2, and rel11 = rel
2
1
Section 5.1 explains how such a notion of equality can be used to establish the equal-
ity of two documents serialized in different formats.
4.6. Canonical Form Serialization
For the purpose of signing documents, we need to be able to produce a serialization of
their canonical form that can be signed. An option is to convert PROV canonical docu-
ments to a representation that already has a canonical form, contruct such a canonical
form and sign it; one such representation is RDF, which is already equipped with a
canonical form [Longley and Sporny 2016; Carroll 2003]. Alternatively, we can specify
a unique serialization, based on some ordering of mergeable terms, to which we can
apply a signature algorithm. We opted for the latter option for a pragmatic reason,
given the existence of a normative specification [Eastlake et al. 2008] and availability
of libraries to sign XML documents. For this, first, we define a lexicographic order on
mergeable terms. The choice of order is arbitrary: its only requirement is to enable
unique serialization. Lexicographic order is adopted because it is easy to implement.
entity ≺ activity ≺ agent ≺ wasDerivedFrom ≺ wasGeneratedBy ≺ used ≺ wasAttributedTo
≺ wasInvalidatedBy ≺ wasInformedBy ≺ wasInfluencedBy ≺ wasStartedBy ≺ wasEndedBy
≺ wasAssociatedWith ≺ actedOnBehalfOf ≺ specializationOf ≺ alternateOf ≺ hadMember
reli(Θ
1
0, . . . ,Θ
1
k, attr
1) ≺ relj(Θ2o, . . . ,Θ2l , attr2) k 6= `
if reli ≺ relj
reli(. . . ,Θ
1
k, . . . ,Θ
1
m, attr
1) ≺ relj(. . . ,Θ2k, . . . ,Θ2m, attr2)
if reli ≺ relj
or reli = relj , Θ1` = Θ
2
` , for ` ∈ [0, k − 1], and Θ1k ≺ Θ2k
or reli = relj , Θ1` = Θ
2
` , for ` ∈ [0,m], and attr1 ≺ attr2
Two sets Θ1,Θ2 are lexicographically ordered, Θ1 ≺ Θ2, if the lexicographically or-
dered sequences of names from Θ1 and Θ2 are lexicographically ordered. Likewise, sets
of attributes can be converted into lexicographically-ordered sequences of key-value
pairs, and therefore can also be ordered lexicographically.
Thus, to construct a serialization of a canonical form, we just need to enumerate all
terms in their lexicographic order, with each set of names or attributes, also serialized
by enumerating their elements in lexicographic order. This addresses Requirement 2.5.
We revisit Figure 3, which for a PROV document, displays its PROV Canonical Form
and the canonical form’s XML serialization. All names have been expanded to full URIs
(to avoid dependencies on prefix declarations), and terms, names, and attributes have
been lexicographically ordered. An attribute Id was added to the document element, as
a means to identify the element subject to signature (see Section 5.2).
5. APPLICATIONS OF PROV CANONICAL FORM
In this section, we discuss applications of PROV Canonical Form to serialization equal-
ity (Section 5.1), signature (Section 5.2) and validation (Section 5.3).
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document
prefix ex <http :// example/>
entity(ex:e10 , [prov:value =1])
entity(ex:e10 , [ex:foo="a"])
wasGeneratedBy(ex:gen10;
ex:e10 ,ex:a1 ,-)
wasGeneratedBy(ex:gen10;
ex:e20 ,ex:a1 ,-)
wasGeneratedBy(ex:e10 ,ex:a1,-,
[ex:foo =1])
wasGeneratedBy(ex:gen20;
ex:e20 ,ex:a1 ,-)
wasGeneratedBy(ex:e20 ,ex:a100 ,-)
endDocument
{
entity( {e10, e20},
{prov:value = 1, ex:foo = "a"})
wasGeneratedBy( {gen10, gen20},
{e10, e20},
{a1},
{ex:foo = 1})
wasGeneratedBy( ∅,
{e10, e20},
{a100},
∅)
}
<?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8"?>
<document Id=" id12345">
<entity >
<id>http :// example/e10 </id>
<id>http :// example/e20 </id>
<attr >
<element >http :// example/foo </element >
<value >a</value >
<type >http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string </type >
</attr >
<attr >
<element >http ://www.w3.org/ns/prov#value </element >
<value >1</value >
<type >http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#int </type >
</attr >
</entity >
<wasGeneratedBy >
<entity >http :// example/e10 </entity >
<entity >http :// example/e20 </entity >
<activity >http :// example/a100 </activity >
</wasGeneratedBy >
<wasGeneratedBy >
<id>http :// example/gen10 </id>
<id>http :// example/gen20 </id>
<entity >http :// example/e10 </entity >
<entity >http :// example/e20 </entity >
<activity >http :// example/a1 </activity >
<attr >
<element >http :// example/foo </element >
<value >1</value >
<type >http :// www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#int </type >
</attr >
</wasGeneratedBy >
</document >
Fig. 3. A PROV document (top left), its PROV Canonical Form (bottom left) and a serialization of its canonical
form in XML (right)
5.1. Application 1: Equality Across Serializations
To establish equality of documents in different serialization formats, we need to de-
fine a mapping of each serialization to PROV Canonical Form. (For conversion between
formats, we further need mappings from PROV Canonical Form to each serialization
format.) It is simple to map the “expression-oriented” serializations such as PROV-
N [Moreau et al. 2013], PROV-XML [Hua et al. 2013], and PROV-JSON [Huynh et al.
2013] to mergeable terms M Term, with a view of determining their canonical form.
Instead, we focus on the mapping of RDF to PROV Canonical Form. It is more chal-
lenging because atomic information in RDF is expressed by triples, and it may take
several triples to encode a PROV term. ProvRDF [ProvRDF 2013] is an incomplete
mapping of RDF to PROV-DM. We revisit this mapping, using mergeable terms, afford-
ing more flexibility than PROV terms. Figure 4 displays the possible mapping for var-
ious forms of generations. The mapping has been decomposed in different categories.
(1) is concerned with the unqualified generation, expressed with a single property; we
see that the mergeable term wasGeneratedBy(∅, {e}, {a}, ∅) refers to the entity e and
activity a, respectively subject and object of property prov:wasGeneratedBy. (2) is con-
cerned with the mapping involving a qualified generation with an unlabeled blank
node [Beckett et al. 2014] for the generation. (3) is describing the mapping for a qual-
ified generation with an explicit blank node : id, which does not appear in the PROV
canonical form since identifiers are expected to be well-formed URIs. (4) deals with a
qualified generation with an explicit identifier. (5) and (6) have in common that no en-
tity is part of the RDF description: (5) deals with generation with a blank node, whereas
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(6) is concerned with the case of a generation with an explicit identifier. Finally, (7) and
(8) deal with the degenerate cases in which no entity nor activity is mentioned.
RDF Triples M Term
1 e wasGeneratedBy a wasGeneratedBy(∅, {e}, {a}, ∅)
e qualifiedGeneration [activity a]. wasGeneratedBy(∅, {e}, {a}, ∅)
2 e qualifiedGeneration [atTime t]. (†)wasGeneratedBy(∅, {e}, ∅, {prov:time = t})
e qualifiedGeneration [activity a; atTime t]. wasGeneratedBy(∅, {e}, {a}, {prov:time = t})
e qualifiedGeneration : id. : id activity a. wasGeneratedBy(∅, {e}, {a}, ∅)
3 e qualifiedGeneration : id. : id atTime t. (†)wasGeneratedBy(∅, {e}, ∅, {prov:time = t})
e qualifiedGeneration : id. : id atTime t. : id activity a.
wasGeneratedBy(∅, {e}, {a}, {prov:time = t})
e qualifiedGeneration id. id activity a. wasGeneratedBy({id}, {e}, {a}, ∅)
4 e qualifiedGeneration id. id atTime t wasGeneratedBy({id}, {e}, ∅, {prov:time = t})
e qualifiedGeneration id. id atTime t. id activity a.
wasGeneratedBy({id}, {e}, {a}, {prov:time = t})
: id a Generation; activity a. (†)wasGeneratedBy(∅, ∅, {a}, ∅)
5 : id a Generation; atTime t. (†)wasGeneratedBy(∅, ∅, ∅, {prov:time = t})
: id a Generation; atTime t; activity a. (†)wasGeneratedBy(∅, ∅, {a}, {prov:time = t})
id a Generation; activity a. wasGeneratedBy({id}, ∅, {a}, ∅)
6 id a Generation; atTime t. wasGeneratedBy({id}, ∅, ∅, {prov:time = t})
id a Generation; activity a; atTime t. wasGeneratedBy({id}, ∅, {a}, {prov:time = t})
: id a Generation; activity a. (†)wasGeneratedBy(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)
7 : id a Generation; atTime t. (†)wasGeneratedBy(∅, ∅, ∅, {prov:time = t})
id a Generation. wasGeneratedBy({id}, ∅, ∅, ∅)
8 id a Generation; atTime t. wasGeneratedBy({id}, ∅, ∅, {prov:time = t})
Fig. 4. Mapping from RDF to Mergeable Terms. All properties and classes are in the PROV namespace.
While Figure 4 exhaustively considers cases for generations, we note that the terms
marked with (†) cannot be merged with any other term by fusion, because they do not
have an identifier and their influencer or influencee is empty, and so are not indexable
with index membershipi,k. It is, however, useful to handle these cases because they al-
low us to define round-trip conversions and to reason about the conditions under which
such round-trip conversions preserve their inputs.
Other PROV relations can be mapped in a similar manner. With the mapping to RDF
now defined, we can map a PROV document to its canonical form, for all serializations.
We can then define equality of two documents d1, d2 in respective serialization formats
f1, f2, in terms of the equality of their respective canonical forms.
5.2. Application 2: Signature
So far, we have defined a canonical form for PROV documents and a serialization ob-
tained by enumerating all terms of the canonical form in lexicographic order. Sec-
tion 4.6 has further presented a unique serialization of the canonical form.
A unique serialization is a necessary prerequisite to a signature mechanism. The
mechanism for signature needs to be made public (ideally, standardized) for third-
parties to be able to perform it independently. An obvious approach, building on exist-
ing standards, is to apply XML Signature [Eastlake et al. 2008] to obtain a signature of
the XML serialization of PROV Canonical Form. An example of signature is contained
in Supplementary Material. The contents of such an XML Signature element consist
of all the information required by a third party to check the signature of a document.
It could be embedded inside a PROV document to form a signed PROV document.
Alternative serialization methods and signatures could be adopted, for instance,
based on the nacent JSON normalization and signature [Sporny 2015; Longley and
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Sporny 2016] as long as the representation of the signature contains all the necessary
information for a third-party to determine how to verify a signature.
5.3. Application 3: Validation
The PROV-CONSTRAINTS specification [Cheney et al. 2013] defines a set of PROV terms
as valid “if their normal form exists and all of the validity constraints succeed on
the normal form”: this ensures that these terms present a logically consistent history,
meaning that a logical interpretation of these terms can be found. By converting terms
to PROV Canonical Form, we have already implemented part of the validation process.
We now examine the steps necessary to carry out validation of terms in PROV Canoni-
cal Form.
The following constraints cater for PCO22 (key-object), PCO23 (key-properties),
PCO24 (unique-generation), PCO25 (unique-invalidation), PCO26 (unique-start), and
PCO27 (unique-end).
CONSTRAINT 5.1 (SET SIZE). Let t∗ ∈ Set(PCF Term), for any Θ,Θ0,Θr,Θe,
Θ1,2,3, attr such that:
— if node(Θ, attr) ∈ t∗, then |Θ| = 1
— if rel1(Θ0,Θe,Θr, attr) ∈ t∗, then |Θ0| ≤ 1 and |Θe| = |Θr| = 1
— if rel2(Θ0,Θe,Θr,Θ1, attr) ∈ t∗, then |Θ0| ≤ 1 and |Θe| = |Θr| = 1 and |Θ1| ≤ 1.
— if rel3(Θ0,Θe,Θr,Θ1,Θ2,Θ3, attr) ∈ t∗, then |Θ0| ≤ 1 and |Θe| = |Θr| = 1 and |Θi| ≤ 1.
We see that the example of Figure 3 does not satisfy Constraint 5.1 because the entity
has two identifiers e10 and e20.
Some attributes, such as those related to time, or value, are expected to have one
value at most (cf. PCO28 (unique-startTime), PCO29 (unique-endTime)).
CONSTRAINT 5.2 (UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES). Let t∗ ∈ Set(PCF Term), for any Θ,Θ0,
Θr,Θe,Θ1,2,3, attr such that:
— if entity(Θ, attr) ∈ t∗, then |attr(prov:value)| ≤ 1.
— if activity(Θ, attr) ∈ t∗, then |attr(prov:startTime)| ≤ 1, |attr(prov:endTime)| ≤ 1.
— if rel1(Θ0,Θe,Θr, attr) ∈ t∗, then |attr(prov:time)| ≤ 1 with rel1 ∈
{wasGeneratedBy,wasInvalidatedBy}.
— if rel2(Θ0,Θe,Θr,Θ1, attr) ∈ t∗, then |attr(prov:time)| ≤ 1 with rel2 ∈
{wasStartedBy,wasEndedBy}.
PROV-CONSTRAINTS defines several impossibility constraints, such as PCO51
(impossible-unspecified-derivation-generation-use), PCO52 (impossible-specialization-
reflexive), PCO53 (impossible-property-overlap), PCO54 (impossible-object-property-
overlap), which are directly applicable to PROV Canonical Form. On the other hand,
PCO55 (entity-activity-disjoint), which requires the set of entities and activities to be
disjoint, can be reformulated as follows:
CONSTRAINT 5.3 (ENTITY ACTIVITY DISJOINT). Let t∗ ∈ Set(PCF Term), for any
Θ,Θ′, attr, attr′ such that entity(Θ, attr) ∈ t∗ and activity(Θ′, attr′) ∈ t∗, then Θ ∩Θ′ = ∅.
Type inference has already been performed as part of the inference transformation.
Constraint PCO50 (typing) further deals with collections, which still need to be han-
dled similarly. Likewise, PCO56 (membership-empty-collection) remains applicable.
Finally, PROV-CONSTRAINTS defines a series of ordering constraints: they should be
applied similarly to PROV Canonical Form. A summary can be found in Supplemen-
tary Material, enumerating all contraints of PROV-CONSTRAINTS and how they are
supported in our revised validation algorithm.
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6. EVALUATION
The definition of canonical presented in Section 4 was used to implement PROV Canon-
ical Form in Scala. The aim of this section is to understand the relative costs of the
various components involved in processing provenance. Specifically, we compare the
time required for the following operations:
— Parsing: loading a file and parsing PROV-N representations;
— Canonization: the canonization procedure;
— Serialization: the procedure to serialize PROV Canonical Form into an XML file;
— Signature: the procedure to sign the XML serialization on the fly;
— Verification: the procedure to check if a signature is valid.
The performance evaluation was conducted on a MacBookPro 10.1, with an Intel
Core i7, 2.7 GHz, and 16Gb of Memory, using the JMH benchmarking framework.
Figure 5 displays the result of this evaluation.
We made use of 4 different files, whose characteristics are displayed in Figure 5
(right). pc1-full is a PROV-N encoding of the provenance of the Provenance Challenge
FMRI workflow [Moreau and Ludaescher 2008]. pc1-with-id1 is a variant in which
all relations are given an identifier (column i shows the number of relations with
identifiers); this dataset exercises index membershipi. pc1-with-id2 duplicates gener-
ations, providing them with new identifiers (see column k), with a view of exercising
index membershipk. Finally, pc1-with-id4 quadruples the number of generations.
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File P C Se Si Ve
pc1-full 100 45 103 495 79
pc1-with-id1 112 77 105 504 83
pc1-with-id2 128 181 108 512 84
pc1-with-id4 160 246 110 533 86
File Characteristics
File n i k
pc1-full 163 0 0
pc1-with-id1 163 110 20
pc1-with-id2 191 130 40
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Fig. 5. Parsing (P), Canonization (C), Serialization (Se), Signing (Si), and Verification (Ve). Left: Absolute
Time. Right: Time Relative to Parsing File pc1-full
With pc1-full, we see that reading is approximately 2.3ms, canonization 45% of
parsing at 1ms; serialization 103%, signature about 500%, and verification about
80%.Canonization has a lower cost than parsing, itself about the same as serialization.
Confidence intervals are displayed in Figure 5 (left), but are too small to be visible;
for instance, the 99.9% interval for canonization is 1ms ± 1.2µs. Signing is performed
on the fly, on the serialized stream: so the time to sign includes the time to serial-
ize (potentially, executed in a separate thread). Checking the signature is a constant
time operation. As the indexation effort and opportunities to fusion terms increase,
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the normalization time also increases. It is our expectation that normalization time
increases faster than that of parsing: profiling our code indicates time is split three
ways between indexing terms (complexity O(dn log(n)), where O(n log(n)) is for index-
ing and O(d) for application of reduce), computing transitive closures of specialization
(complexity (O(spec3))) and applying membership function (complexity (O(|N|3)), with
n, spec,N, d the number of specializations, variables, names, and mergeable terms, re-
spectively. While the theoretical worst case complexity exhibits high-degree polyno-
mials, we have observed that such cases have to be engineered (as in our evaluation)
rather than occur in usually generated provenance.
The take-home message is that for documents that are essentially already in canon-
ical form, the canonisation cost is a fraction of that of parsing. As the number of terms
to be merged increases, the canonisation cost overtakes that of parsing, while still
remaining a small fraction of signing a document.
7. RELATED WORK
This work focuses on PROV, a model of provenance that can be represented as graphs.
For a survey of provenance in databases, we refer the reader to [Cheney et al. 2009]. In
computer science, canonization (also canonicalization) is a process for converting data
that has more than one possible representation into a common form. It is important to
contrast PROV Canonical Form with “graph canonical forms” in graph theory.
In graph theory literature, graphs consist of unlabelled nodes and unlabelled edges.
In graph theory, an isomorphism between two graphs G and H is a bijection f between
the vertex sets of G and H such that any two vertices u and v of G are adjacent in G if
and only if f(u) and f(v) are adjacent inH. The graph isomorphism problem consists of
deciding whether two graphs are isomorphic. A common way of solving this problem is
to determine if the canonical representations of those graphs are identical. A canonical
representation is obtained by a canonization process: a canonical form of a graph G is
a labeled graph that is isomorphic to G, such that every graph that is isomorphic to
G has the same canonical form as G. McKay’s “nauty” algorithm [McKay and Piperno
2014] is an example of graph canonization. The graph isomorphism problem is not
known to be solvable in polynomial time, but is not known to be NP-complete either.
The problem we tackle with PROV documents is different, since nodes are labelled (with
their identifiers) and edges are also labelled (with their kinds and optional identifiers)
and directed. For this reason, we opted to talk about PROV documents, and kept the
term “graph” to refer to the eponymous notion in graph theory.
The ability to compare two RDF graphs for equality is a fundamental operation of
the Semantic Web [Carroll 2002]. RDF graph equality is a specific instance of the graph
isomorphism problem. Like PROV graphs, RDF graphs are also directed graphs, with
labeled edges but partially labelled nodes (since blank nodes are allowed in RDF). Car-
roll’s approach to an RDF graph canonical form is to apply the iterative vertex classifi-
cation algorithm [Read and Corneil 1977].
To sign RDF graphs, however, Carroll [Carroll 2003] introduces Canonical RDF, con-
sisting of lexicographically ordered triples, with an extra mechanism to “normalize”
the names of blank nodes. The complexity of this operation is known to be O(n log(n)).
A more recent canonization algorithm is being developed by Longley and Sporny [Lon-
gley and Sporny 2016] for RDF datasets, with a view of defining a message signature
algorithm as part of a secure messaging layer [Sporny 2015]. The signature itself is
represented as a JSON dictionary, including the signature algorithm, the creator, the
date of creation, and the signature value.
XML Signature [Eastlake et al. 2008] provides integrity and message authentica-
tion for XML documents. The processing rule and syntax of XML Signature meet
some requirements [Reagle 2008]: XML-signature data structures are based on the
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RDF data model. Multiple XML-signatures must be able to co-exist over the content of
an XML Document given varied keys, content transformations, and algorithm specifi-
cations (signature, hash, canonicalization, etc.). XML-signatures are XML elements,
and thus first class objects and consequently can be referenced and signed. While
XML-Signature permits arbitrary cryptographic signature algorithms, it mandates
support for signature canonicalization, content canonicalization, hash, and signature
algorithm.
The canonical form of an XML document [Boyer and Marcy 2008] is a physical rep-
resentation of the document that underwent several transformative steps. We enu-
merate a few that are relevant to this paper: the document is encoded in UTF-8; line
breaks are normalized; namespace declarations and attributes of each element are lex-
icographically ordered; whitespace outside of the document element and within start
and end tags is normalized; attribute value delimiters are set to double quotes.
Experience with writing converters (cf. ProvToolbox4) shows that each represen-
tation has its own quirks, and round-trip conversion between representations is not
straightforward. Therefore, formalising conversions between representations is criti-
cal, and PROV Canonical Form is a significant step in this direction. In the context
of standardisation, formalisations of PROV can be found in PROV-CONSTRAINTS [Ch-
eney et al. 2013] and PROV-SEM [Cheney 2013]. The former specifies a notion of valid
provenance using a set of logical declarative rules, whereas the latter consists of
a model-theoretic semantics for PROV. The temporal constraints specified by PROV-
CONSTRAINTS were inspired by an earlier formalisation [Kwasnikowska et al. 2015] of
the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [Moreau et al. 2011].
While our work focuses on creating a canonical form suitable for signature, oth-
ers have investigated the contents of the provenance to be signed so as to offer
some guarantees to applications. Gadelha and Matthoso propose the Kairos architec-
ture [Gadelha and Mattoso 2008] featuring a timestamping service, which combined
with signature capability, offers a non-repudiable record of authorship and time for
grid applications. Concerned by undetected rewrites of history, Hasan et al. [2009]
propose a linear provenance record chaining technique, which embeds in a record the
signature of its predecessors. This scheme is susceptible to attack on the most recent
record, since it could be replaced by a new one pointing to the same predecessors. To
avoid this type of attacks, the public-key linked chain [Wang et al. 2012] adds to a
record the public key of the successor in the chain. Such techniques are important, for
instance, in applications where audits [Aldeco-Pe´rez and Moreau 2010] have to ensure
that the history has not been rewritten.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
Provenance documents can vary because of their syntactic representations or because
of simple PROV inferences. We have presented PROV Canonical Form, which allows
documents to be reduced to a common normalized representation, to be compared and
to be signed. The canonization algorithm, converting a provenance document to its
canonical form, is defined as a fixed point, demonstrated to exist for any PROV docu-
ment. An empirical evaluation shows that the algorithm is tractable and its execution
is only a fraction of input and output operations.
PROV Canonical Form has a number of important applications. First, it addresses
a shortcoming of the standardization process of PROV, which defined a normal form
within the context a validation procedure, but only for some provenance documents. So,
with this work, validation can instead be defined on the canonical form. Furthermore,
safe round-trip conversions can be defined using PROV Canonical Form.
Finally, one of the key drivers for this work is the need to sign provenance: prove-
nance is only useful if it can be proven not to have been tampered with. We have
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provided the means to uniquely serialize PROV Canonical Form and apply standard
cryptographic signature techniques to it.
This work presents further opportunities related to systems deployment and stan-
dardisation activities. Practically, a provenance signature service could be deployed:
such a service could sign provenance documents and check the validity of signatures.
It could further be integrated with a provenance repository such as ProvStore [Huynh
and Moreau 2014]. It may be worthwhile to explore how a repository for signed prove-
nance documents could further be combined with distributed ledger technology, allow-
ing distributed proof-of-work to bring trust to a provenance repository.
However, for such an environment to succeed, inter-operability is required, so that
the signing of documents and the checking of signatures can be performed by inde-
pendent agents. A standardization group needs to specify the serialization of PROV
Canonical Form, the transformations allowed to be applied prior to signature, the al-
gorithms supported for signing, and the representation of the signature, and where it
is allowed to be inserted in PROV documents.
Another important aspect of inter-operability is the conversion of all serializations of
PROV to PROV canonical form, and vice-versa. To address it fully, one needs to further
specify the necessary conventions to ensure that round-trip conversions are contents
preserving.
A. DATA AVAILABILITY
The data supporting the evaluation of Section 6 are openly available from the Univer-
sity of Southampton repository at DOI: 10.5258/SOTON/402535.
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